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Abstract. One of the main problems in Network Intrusion Detection
comes from constant rise of new attacks, so that not enough labeled
examples are available for the new classes of attacks. Traditional Machine
Learning approaches hardly address such problem. This can be overcome
with Zero-Shot Learning, a new approach in the field of Computer Vision,
which can be described in two stages: the Attribute Learning and the
Inference Stage. The goal of this paper is to propose a new Inference
Stage algorithm for Network Intrusion Detection. In order to attain this
objective, we firstly put forward an experimental setup for the evaluation
of the Zero-Shot Learning in Network Intrusion Detection related tasks.
Secondly, a decision tree based algorithm is applied to extract rules for
generating the attributes in the AL stage. Finally, using a representation
of a Zero-Shot Class as a point in the Grassmann manifold, an explicit
formula for the shortest distance between points in that manifold can
be used to compute the geodesic distance between the Zero-Shot Classes
which represent the new attacks and the Known Classes corresponding
to the attack categories. The experimental results in the datasets KDD
Cup 99 and NSL-KDD show that our approach with Zero-Shot Learning
successfully addresses the Network Intrusion Detection problem.
Keywords: Zero-Shot Learning; Grassmannian; Intrusion Detection.
1 Introduction
The network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are classified according to their
detection type: (i) misuse detection, which monitors the activity with previous
descriptions of known malicious behavior; (ii) anomaly detection, which defines
a profile for normal activity and looks for deviations; (iii) hybrid detection, re-
sulting from a combination of the previous detection methods. The first two
approaches have been widely studied and addressed by extensive academic re-
search, yielding good results that rely on Machine Learning (ML) tools. However,
⋆⋆ Corresponding author
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the deployment of those systems in operational settings has been rather limited.
For instance, one of the main challenges related to Network Intrusion Detection
(NID) is the detection of new attacks. One possible way to face such incidents
is to use outlier detection approaches. But these ML algorithms perform much
better in matching similarities (misuse detection) than in finding activities that
do not adjust to some predefined profile (anomaly detection).
Zero-Shot Learning (ZSL) is a recent approach that has gained popularity to
solve computer vision related tasks in which new classes may appear after the
learning stage [1,2,3]. Traditional ML cannot tackle these challenging scenarios.
ZSL uses an intermediate level called attributes. This level provides semantic
information about the classes to classify. It is a way to identify new objects
matching its descriptions in terms of attributes with concepts previously learned
[3]. Explained in a formal way, traditional classification learns, from labeled data,
a mapping function f : X → Y from an input x, belonging to the space X , to
an output y in the class space Y . In ZSL there are no labeled samples for some
classes in the space Y and still a prediction is required [1].
In this paper, we address the problem of detecting new attacks by a rather
innovative use of a ZSL approach in two-stages: first, it uses the signatures
of known attacks to learn the attributes; second, it makes inference of the new
classes after some data transformation in the Grassmannian. Our approach which
can be considered a hybrid-based one has contributions in both ZSL stages as it
will be explained in the next sections.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief overview
of the Zero–Shot Learning approach. Section 3 contains a short description of
the Grassmannian, the manifold that will be used to represent the data. The
experimental setup appears in Section 4. In Section 5, the Inference Network
Intrusion Detection (INID) Algorithm for the application of ZSL is proposed. In
Section 6, the results of INID evaluation on KDD Cup 99 and NSL-KDD datasets
are discussed. Finally, in Section 7, we address the conclusions and future work.
2 Zero-Shot Learning Background
ZSL has simply two stages. The first one is Attribute Learning (AL), where
an intermediate layer that provides semantic information about the classes is
learned. The goal is to capture knowledge from data. The semantic information
obtained from this stage is used in the second one, the Inference stage (IS), to
classify instances among a new set of classes. For modeling the relationships
among features, attributes, and classes, different solutions have been proposed
[2,3].
The Attribute Learning (AL) stage in the context of NIDS was first pro-
posed in [4]. Therein, different Machine Learning algorithms on two prepro-
cessed datasets: (i) KDD Cup 99 and (ii) NSL-KDD were evaluated. The best
result was obtained from the evaluation of C45 decision tree algorithm with the
classification accuracy of 99.54%. The Attribute Learning for Network Intrusion
Detection (ALNID) proposed therein is a rule-based algorithm which weights
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the attributes according to their entropy and frequency in the extracted rules.
The input to the algorithm ALNID is the set of instances X = {Ai}, i = 1 · · ·m.
Each instance A is composed of d attributes A = {a1, · · · , ad}. The quantity
of information (QI), the entropy (E) and the information gain (G) were com-
puted for each ai ∈ A. During each iteration, the number of times that each ai
attribute was evaluated by each rule of the set R = {r1, · · · , rj} was recorded.
With this frequency count (increasing by each time an attribute is evaluated by
the rule rj) a new set of attributes A
′ = {a′
1
, · · · , a′d} is created. As a result, the
algorithm returns the set of new valued instances X = {A′i}, i = 1 · · ·m [4].
During the Inference Stage (IS), classes are inferred from the learned at-
tributes. There are three approaches for this second stage [3]: K-Nearest Neigh-
bour (K–NN), probabilistic frameworks [2], and energy function [1,3]. The K–NN
inference consists in finding the closest test class signature to the predicted at-
tribute signature found by mapping the input instance into the attribute space in
the previous stage. In the cascaded inference probabilistic framework proposed
in [2] the predicted attributes in the AL stage are combined to determine the
most likely target class. The approach has two variants: (i) Directed Attribute
Prediction (DAP), which learns a probabilistic classifier for each attribute dur-
ing the AL stage. The classifiers are then used during the IS to infer new classes
from their attributes signatures. In another variant (ii) Indirected Attribute Pre-
diction (IAP), the predictions from individual classifiers, one per each training
class, are obtained. At test time, the predictions for all training classes induce
a labelling of the attribute layer from which a labelling over the test classes can
be inferred [5].
In a recent approach [1,3,6] based on energy function one considers at the
training stage z known classes (KC), which have a signature composed of a
attributes. Those signatures are represented by a matrix S ∈ [0, 1]a×z, where
[0, 1]a×z denotes the set of matrices of order a×z whose entries belong to the real
interval [0, 1]. The entries of S represent the relationship between each attribute
and the classes. The instances available at training stage are denoted by a matrix
X ∈ Rd×m, where d is the dimensionality of the data, and m is the number of
instances. The matrix Y ∈ {−1, 1}m×z is computed to indicate to which class
each instance belongs, and during the training the following matrix V ∈ Rd×a,
where γ and λ are hyper-parameters of the regularizer, is also computed[3]:
V = (XXT + γI)−1XY ST (SST + λI)−1. (1)
In IS, a new set of z′ classes is defined by their attributes signatures, S′ ∈
[0, 1]a×z
′
. Given a new instance x, the prediction is given by:
argmax
i
(xTV S′i). (2)
3 Grassmann Manifold
We introduce the manifold that will play the main role herein. The Grassmann
manifold (or simply, the Grassmannian), hereafter denoted by Gk,m, is the set of
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all k-dimensional linear subspaces in Rm (k ≤ m). This manifold, which doesn’t
have the geometry of an Euclidean space, has a matrix representation as:
Gk,m = {P ∈ R
m×m : P 2 = P, PT = P, rank(P ) = k}. (3)
Gk,m can be equipped with a metric inherited from the Euclidean metric on the
vector space consisting of all m×m matrices.
There are other authors that do not identify a point in the Grassmann man-
ifold with a subspace, but rather with an orthonormal frame that generates that
subspace. In this case, points in the Grassmann are represented by rectangu-
lar m × k matrices whose columns are orthonormal. This is, for instance, the
representation followed in [7]. Distances between two points P1 and P2 in the
Grassmannian are often defined using the notion of principal angle which can be
calculated from the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of the matrix PT
1
P2.
A list of the most commom distance functions used in the literature, as well as
a comparison among them, can be found, for instance, in [8].
However, in the present article, besides the different representation of the
Grassmann manifold as above, we adopt an alternative way, proposed in [9], to
compute distances in Gk,m. More precisely, we use the following closed formula
for the geodesic distance between two points P1 and P2 in Gk,m, that depends
on the two points only.
d2(P1, P2) = −
1
4
trace
(
log2((I − 2P2)(I − 2P1))
)
, (4)
where log is the principal logarithm of a matrix. Note that d2(P1, P2) ≥ 0.
This is due to the fact that, for P1, P2 ∈ Gk,m, the matrix (I − 2P2)(I − 2P1) is
orthogonal and its log is skewsymmetric. So log2((I−2P2)(I−2P1)) is symmetric
with negative trace.
4 Experimental Setup
Network Intrusion Datasets. The KDD Cup 99 intrusion detection database1,
contains approximately 5 million samples. This dataset contains four different
types of attacks: Denial Of Service (DOS), unauthorized access from a remote
machine (R2L), U2R and probing. Each instance represents a TCP/IP connec-
tion composed by 41 features. A new dataset with 125, 973 selected records,
NSL-KDD2 solves the criticism of data samples redundancy in KDD Cup 99.
Both datasets contain 23 classes, where one class corresponds to normal traffic
and the remainder 22 classes represent attacks. Some attacks have few records
such as: spy and perl with just 2 and 3 instances respectively, while other classes
such as: normal and smurf attack are represented by 97, 277 and 280, 790 respec-
tively. Table 1 presents the attack categories and instances and for NSL-KDD.
Data Preprocessing. In [4] a data setup was proposed for the AL stage of
ZSL in NIDS. Similarly, the preprocessing ifor NSL-KDD3 is:
1 Available at http://www.kdd.org/kddcup/index.php
2 http://www.unb.ca/research/iscx/dataset/iscx-NSL-KDD-dataset.html
3 Due to space limitations we present only the NSL-KDD setup for Zero-Shot Learning.
A Grassmannian Approach to Zero-Shot Learning 5
Table 1. Experimental NSL-KDD dataset setup for Zero-Shot Learning.
Category of
Attacks
Known
Classes
Instances per
Known Classes
Zero-Shot
Classes
Instances per
Zero-Shot Classes
DoS
smurf 2646
teardrop 892
neptune 41,214
back 956
land 19
pod 201
Normal normal 67,343 - -
Probe satan 3632 ipsweep 3599
portsweep 2931 nmap 1493
R2L
warezclient 890
guess passwd 53warezmaster 20
ftp write 8
multihop 8
imap 648phf 4
spy 2
U2R buffer overflow 30 rootkit 10
loadmodule 9 perl 3
1. Taking into account [4], the selected attributes from the original 41 were: 1,
2, 5, 6, 9, 23, 24, 29, 32, 33, 34 and 36.
2. For each category of network attack, the instances which represent two
classes of attacks were removed – the Zero Shot Classes (ZSC) (see Table 14)
3. The original attack labels were replaced by their corresponding category (e.g.
labels such as: smurf, neptune, back and pod were replaced by their category
label: DoS ). The categories are the Known Classes (KC).
4. The datasets were split into different files by categories.
Data Transformation. In this section we explain how to associate data to
points in Gk,m. The data transformation is described in the following steps:
1. A set of data is first represented as a rectangular matrix Xm×d, where m is
the number of instances and d the number of attributes.
2. The matrix Xm×d is decomposed using the Singular Value Decomposition
Xm×d = Um×mΣm×d V
T
d×d, (5)
the matrices U and V are orthogonal (UUT = Im, V V
T = Id) and Σ is a
quasi-diagonal matrix containing the singular values σ1, · · · , σd of X , in non-
increasing order, along the main diagonal. Since XXT = U(ΣΣT )UT , the
columns of U are the eigenvectors associated to the eigenvalues λi of XX
T ,
which are the square of the singular values of X and are, by convention, also
descendent sorted (λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ... ≥ λm ≥ 0). The columns of the matrix
Um×m are called the eigenvectors of the SVD decomposition.
4 Note that by adding the number of KC (15, 2nd column) and the number ZSC (8,
4th column) we obtain the total number of 23 classes for this dataset.
6 Jorge Rivero1, Bernardete Ribeiro1∗∗, Ning Chen2, and Fa´tima Silva Leite3
Fig. 1. Zero-Shot Learning framework[4]. Left: network traffic datasets; Middle: At-
tribute learning Stage; Right: Inference Stage.
3. Since the first columns of U are the most significant directions, we define
a threshold 0 < α ≤ 100 that selects the most important eigenvectors of
U and with them we form the submatrix Sm×k, whose columns form an
orthonormal set of k vectors in Rm, i.e, STS = Ik, and k must satisfy the
condition
k∑
i=0
λi
m∑
i=0
λi
∗ 100 ≥ α. (6)
4. From the previous matrix Sm×k, we compute a square matrix Pm×m = SS
T ,
which can easily be proven to belong to the Grassmann manifold Gk,m. This
matrix Pm×m gives a representation of the data in the Grassmannian.
Having the data represented in the Grassmannian, the formula (4) for the
geodesic distance between points in that manifold can be used to compute the
shortest distance between the zero-shot classes and the known classes.
5 Proposed Inference Algorithm Based on Grassmannian
In this section we propose an Inference Network Intrusion Detection (INID) Al-
gorithm for the second stage of the Zero Shot Learning approach. In Figure 1
the overall tasks are depicted including the two-stages identified as Attribute
Learning and Inference Learning. The algorithm 1 INID requires as inputs the
results from the first stage, i.e., the outputs of the ALNID algorithm [4] which
tackles the attribute learning problem, and outputs the mean distances using
the geodesic distance between two points in the Grassmannian given by formula
(4). Algorithm 1 INID begins with the data transformation required to map the
data into a Grassmannian. It requires two sets of learned attributes from Algo-
rithm ALNID which takes both preprocessed datasets for learning the attributes
needed for the IS stage. These are the learned attributes of ZSC (Algorithm 1,
Z) and the learned attributes of KC (Algorithm 1, K). Then, these matrices are
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Algorithm 1 INID: Inference for Network Intrusion Detection
Require: Z , K , cutoff percent
1: batch start, batch stop = 0
2: distances list = [ ]
3: batches = K.rows / Z.rows
4: for batch in batches do
5: batch stop = Z.rows + batch start
6: data batch = K[batch start:batch stop]
7: U Z, s Z, V Z = SVD(Z)
8: U K batch,s K batch, V K batch=SVD(data batch)
9: columns = SelectEigenValues(U Z, s Z, U K batch, s K batch, cutoff percent)
10: P2=U Z[:,0:columns]*U Z[:,0:columns].T
11: P1 = U K batch[:,0:columns] * U K batch[:,0:columns].T
12: distance =sqrt(−1/4 ∗ trace(log2((I − 2P2)(I − 2P1))))
13: distances list.append(distance)
14: batch start = batch stop + 1
15: end for
16: return mean(distances list)
processed in different batches with Xm×d matrix (Algorithm 1, lines: 1–6). In
the sequel, for each batch, the factorization step is performed by the Singular
Value Decomposition (Algorithm 1, lines: 7–8). Hereafter, the sub-matrix Sm×k
is computed by selecting the first k columns (according to (6), Algorithm 1, line:
9) of U , where α is the cut-off percent. In the following step, the matrices P1
and P2 = SS
T , which live in the Grassmannian defined in (3), are computed
(Algorithm 1, lines: 10–11). After this data transformation, the distance between
P1 and P2 is computed (formula (4), Algorithm 1, line: 12). The algorithm re-
turns the mean of the distances between Z and all batches computed from K
(Algorithm 1, line: 16).
Table 2. Evaluated distance functions
Distance Functions Formula
Frobenius Distance d2F (X1, X2) =‖ X1 −X2 ‖F= trace((X1 −X2)
T (X1 −X2))
Grassmannian Distance d2(P1, P2) = −
1
4
trace
(
log2((I − 2P2)(I − 2P1))
)
6 Results and Discussion
The evaluation of our proposal was done in different batches. Each batch size was
determined by the number of instances of the ZSC class. In order to validate the
results, the means of the distances among all the batches of each category and
the ZSC were computed. In Table 2 we highlight the formula for the Frobenius
distance, commonly used in ML (see, for instance, [3,10], and the new formula
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Table 3. Grassmannian computed distances mean on KDD Cup 99 dataset.
Zero Shot Class (ZSC) Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R
teardrop (DoS) 3.0608 2.5190 4.0247 2.5231 2.5588
land (DoS) 2.7603 2.4949 2.6493 2.5601 2.5600
ipsweep (Probe) 0.7081 0.0587 0.0539 2.4769 2.5298
nmap (Probe) 2.8888 2.5347 2.5012 3.0173 2.8697
guess passwd (R2L) 0.5588 0.1637 0.6675 0.0249 2.5327
imap (R2L) 2.6924 2.5770 2.6014 2.5160 3.5102
rootkit (U2R) 2.6239 2.5033 3.4797 2.5479 2.4976
perl (U2R) 0.1895 0.0090 0.0717 0.5869 0.0581
Table 4. Grassmannian computed distances mean on NSL-KDD dataset.
Zero Shot Class (ZSC) Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R
teardrop (DoS) 4.4785 2.5300 4.7464 4.8005 4.6889
land (DoS) 3.2897 2.6301 3.9121 3.6518 4.4227
ipsweep (Probe) 2.5609 2.4950 0.0605 2.4812 2.5167
nmap (Probe) 4.6949 4.8336 2.5280 4.7910 4.7170
guess passwd (R2L) 1.5401 2.4461 2.5099 0.0655 2.5195
imap (R2L) 3.1187 3.4144 3.5278 2.5430 2.6641
rootkit (U2R) 3.0829 3.2873 3.4814 3.3095 2.6847
perl (U2R) 0.8621 0.8786 1.6779 0.3715 1.3230
Table 5. Frobenius computed distances mean on KDD Cup 99 dataset.
Zero Shot Class (ZSC) Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R
teardrop (D) 0.1205 0.0468 0.8548 1.3097 1.0172
land (D) 1.4359 0.4416 1.6868 1.7090 2.4949
ipsweep (P) 2.9133 0.1449 0.2424 2.7623 1.7281
nmap (P) 1.7207 0.4452 0.0397 2.7267 2.0296
guess passwd (R) 1.6629 1.1183 0.4993 1.7366 2.0681
imap (R) 0.7023 0.7212 0.7928 1.7694 2.3412
rootkit (U) 2.6602 0.3621 0.0367 2.8921 2.5664
perl (U) 1.4898 0.6870 1.1751 2.9581 1.9001
Table 6. Frobenius computed distances mean on NSL-KDD dataset.
Zero Shot Class (ZSC) Normal DoS Probe R2L U2R
teardrop (D) 0.3541 1.0402 0.7990 2.2335 1.8625
land (D) 1.6816 0.3378 1.8476 1.7114 1.7814
ipsweep (P) 2.1601 0.2042 0.6908 2.1157 2.9321
nmap (P) 1.9747 1.5818 0.2457 2.0880 2.3004
guess passwd (R) 0.4146 1.8328 1.6318 2.7305 1.8766
imap (R) 0.5065 0.2485 0.8849 1.2402 1.6496
rootkit (U) 0.2427 0.7338 1.2477 1.4055 2.5617
perl (U) 1.2974 2.2123 2.6119 2.8423 2.8073
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for the Grassmannian distance that is used in this paper after data transfor-
mation (see Section 4). In Table 3, the evaluation results of our approach in
the KDD Cup 99 dataset are presented. It is observed that for each ZSC the
shortest distance computed corresponds to its respective category of attack. We
emphasize that this occurs for almost all the ZSC considered: teardrop (DoS),
land(DoS), issweep (Probe), nmap (Probe), guess passwd (R2L), imap (R2L),
rootkit (U2R) (in bold). Since only three instances of the ZSC perl were eval-
uated, the shortest distance was wrongly ’assigned’ to the attack category DoS
(in red). Likewise, in the NSL-KDD dataset (see Table 4) only the ZSC perl is
wrongly ’assigned’ to class R2L (in red). A close look at each row Table 3 reveals
that the second shortest distance for most of the ZSC in KDD Cup 99 was in
DoS category showing its redundancy. For comparison Tables 5 and 6 illustrate
the misplacements of ZSC (in red) relatively to the ground truth when Frobenius
distance is used.
For the prediction models, two K-NN algorithms were used. The first one,
with the geodesic distance in the Grassmannian proposed in [9], and the second
one, with the Frobenius distance function both illustrated in Table 7 with the
performance results. Both datasets were respectively split into 70% for training
and the remaining 30% for test. For each evaluation the distance between each
new data instance and the instances previously stored is computed. The Table 7
Table 7. K-NN Prediction Model Performance (K was set to 5)
Metrics Grassmannian Distance Frobenius Distance
Classification Accuracy 90.61% 82.93%
Logarithmic Loss 0.228 0.122
AUC 86.1% 68.5%
shows the performance metrics evaluated for each prediction model. Firstly with
a classification accuracy of 90.61%, our proposal shows better performance than
the one based on Frobenius distance, while showing a small Logarithmic Loss.
Finally, the AUC metric shows very good results with a value of 86.1%.
The Grassmannian approach validates the AL algorithm proposed in [4] and
the data transformation into the Grassmann manifold. Moreover, our results
reveal the potential of the mathematical formula (4) in [9] that computes the
geodesic distance in the Grassmann manifold, with better results than other
approaches. This might be of particular importance to solve other problems in
ML that require computing distances among data points.
7 Conclusions
The need for detecting new attacks on traffic networks, together with the com-
petence of the ZSL approach to classify new classes without any example during
training, motivated its application to NIDS. This study takes into account our
previous results of the ALNID algorithm proposed in [4] for the AL stage which
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provided a significant improvement in the attributes representation. The good
class separability found by the learned attributes lead us to look for an instance-
based inference stage. We then resorted to a simplified and non-overlapping rep-
resentation of data points that lie along a low-dimensional manifold embedded
in a high-dimensional attributes space. Therefore, we transformed the learned
attributes and represented them on the Grassmannian. We proposed the INID
algorithm for the IS stage of the ZSL approach using KDD Cup 99 and NSL-
KDD datasets. The algorithm computes the Grassmannian distances between
the known attack KC and the selected ZSC both represented as points in the
Grassmann manifold. The prediction results by K-NN show that our method
excels in performance as compared to Frobenius distance computed in the same
predictor. Further work will explore the manifolds’ representation.
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